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I. INTRODUCTION
Fred Phelps is the pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church, whose mem-
bers frequently protest at events across the United States which they perceive
to be sympathetic to gay and lesbian rights, because they believe that the
United States has become overly supportive of such rights.' The following is
a poem written by Fred Phelps, entitled "God Hates America,"2 which is
sung to the tune of "God Bless America."
God hates America
Home of the fags
He abhors them
Deplores them
Day and night, all his might, all his days
From her mountains
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.A., The American University, School of International Service. The author wishes to
thank his family and friends for their support and encouragement, especially his wife Carly,
and his peers David Haas, David Lubitz, and Paul Rogers. He also wishes to thank his profes-
sors for their tutelage, and the entire NOVA LAW REVIEw staff for their hard work.
1. See generally GodHatesAmerica.com, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/index.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
2. FRED PHELPS, GOD HATES AMERICA (Westboro Baptist Church, Topeka, Kan.), avail-
able at http://www.godhatesamerica.com/pdf/lyrics/godhatesamerica.pdf.
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To her prairies
To her oceans
White with foam
God hates America!
The perverts' home!3
This homophobic attitude, held by individuals and segments of society
that are sympathetic to Mr. Phelps' viewpoint, is one of the catalyzing forces
behind the efforts of homosexual rights advocates. Sexual orientation is de-
fined as "[a] person's predisposition or inclination toward a particular type of
sexual activity or behavior; heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality."4
Generally, "[t]here has been a trend in recent years to make sexual orienta-
tion a protected class."5 With regard to Florida, there have been muted ef-
forts in sporadic areas since the 1970s, which have met with little success.6
Part II of this article will examine how these efforts have played out on a
local scale, by reviewing the minority of municipalities in Florida which
have enacted ordinances relating to sexual orientation. Part III examines the
dearth of case law that exists which provides protections against discrimina-
tion based upon sexual orientation in the Florida Constitution; Part III also
examines whether or not the United States Constitution may be used to strike
down Florida laws, which discriminate based upon a person's sexual orienta-
tion. Part IV examines the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, a proposed
amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, which would grant ex-
plicit protections to gays and lesbians currently lacking in the statute, and
innovative legal theories which have unsuccessfully attempted to find protec-
tions against discrimination based upon sexual orientation in the existing
Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Part V discusses a proposed amendment to
the Florida Constitution which would place a significant obstacle to the right
of homosexual couples to enter into a marriage, or even legal relationships
resembling a marriage. Part VI is a conclusion as to what the state of the law
is in Florida with regard to protections existing against discrimination based
upon sexual orientation and a recommendation as to what the status of the
law should be.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004).
5. Id.
6. See generally Allan H. Ter, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in
Florida, 24 NOVA L. REV. 793 (2000). Ten provides a historical perspective on the develop-
ment of gay and lesbian rights in Florida, including chronological information on when a
number of ordinances were enacted. Id; see also William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at Lesbian
and Gay Rights in Florida Today: Confronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus, 24
NOVA L. REV. 751, 756 (2000).
2008]
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II. A SURVEY OF FLORIDA MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE
EFFORTS TO EITHER SUPPORT OR HINDER THE ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES
WHICH PREVENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
There are 301 listed municipalities in Florida, including counties, cities,
villages, towns, and other similar affiliations.7 Beginning in the late 1970s, a
small number of Florida municipalities began to enact ordinances against
discrimination.8 Unfortunately for the gay and lesbian community, the sub-
sequent decades bore out sporadic efforts meeting with limited success,
rather than a concerted statewide push.9 During this time period, there have
been occasional backlashes against gay and lesbian activists, and thus, legis-
lative efforts with regard to sexual orientation can be divided into legislation
that promotes gay and lesbian rights, or hinders gay and lesbian rights.'°
A. Ordinances Enacted to Protect Against Discrimination in Specific Areas
After conducting a survey of the ordinances of all 301 listed Florida
municipalities, which includes counties, cities, towns, villages, and similar
incorporations, it appears that only seventy-one have enacted ordinances"
that are intended to prevent or discourage discrimination based upon sexual
orientation in very specific areas of concern, not merely generalized policies
of non-discrimination. 2 The distinction of being the first municipality in
Florida to pass such an ordinance belongs to Miami-Dade County, which
passed a protective ordinance on January 18, 1977.13 The number of munici-
palities offering protective legislation, while amounting to a sizeable per-
centage of the number of municipalities, is misleading if taken out of context
because among the seventy-one that have enacted protective legislation,
there is a splintering of priorities in all facets of life, with some municipali-
ties enacting protective ordinances in multiple areas, and others enacting
ordinances in only one area.'4 Additionally, while any ordinance offering
protections based upon sexual orientation benefits the gay and lesbian com-
7. Municipal Code Corp., Online Library: Florida,
http://www.municode.com/Resources/code-list.asp?stateID=9 (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
8. Terl, supra note 6, at 804.
9. Municipal Code Corp., supra note 7.
10. See infra notes 16-28, 38-39 and accompanying discussion.
11. See infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
12. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying discussion.
13. Terl, supra note 6, at 804; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 757-58, 759 n.58. Ad-
ams lists several Florida cities which had enacted laws, and municipalities which had enacted
ordinances banning discrimination by the year 2000. Id.
14. See generally infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
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munity, many of the municipalities have enacted protections in relatively
obscure areas which have little practical effect on the lives of gays and lesbi-
ans; while the communities which have enacted protections should be lauded
for their efforts, the thin patchwork of existing Florida ordinances offers little
in terms of a practical solution to discrimination against gays and lesbians. 5
1. Employment, Housing, and Public Accommodations
Eighteen Florida municipalities have enacted policies against discrimi-
nation based upon sexual orientation with regard to employment practices.
1 6
Thirty-one Florida municipalities offer some form of protection against dis-
crimination based upon sexual orientation in the acquisition of housing, se-
curing of credit, or a mortgage.' 7 Ten Florida municipalities prohibit dis-
15. See generally infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
16. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-221 (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE § 16-/2-21(f)(1) (2007); COCONUT CREEK, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 21-5.1 (2007);
GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-48 (2007); GULFPORT FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 26-20 (2007); JUPITER, FLA., CODE § 15-21(a) (2007); LAUDERDALE LAKES,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 66-36(a) (2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007);
MIAMI-DADE CouNwY, FLA., CODE § 11A-34(1) (2007); MIRAMAR, FLA., CODE § 16-2(2)
(2007); MONROE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 13-103(a) (2007); OAKLAND PARK, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-81(5) (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 2-262 (2007); S. FLA.
WATER MGMT. DIST., POLICIES & PROCEDURES § 220-3(c)(1) (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE §
18-36(2) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-96(a)(2) (2007); TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 26.5-176(a) (2007); W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-31
(2007).
17. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-28(1) (2008); LEVY COUNTY, FLA., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 70-36(e)(3) (2008); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE § 57.36(1)(b) (2008); WALTON
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-59(e) (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE §
16Y2-23.1(e) (2007); CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS & ORDINANCES § 1-8-63(c)(3)
(2007); COCOA, FLA., CODE § 7-35(d)(3) (2007); FORT PIERCE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §
8.5-26(3) (2007); FRANKLIN COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES § 9-47(e)(3)
(2007); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-86 (2007); GILCHRIST COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 47-6(c)(2) (2007); GULFPORT, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-30
(2007); LEON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS § 9-27 (2007); MANATEE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-17-76(d)(3) (2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007); MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 11A-12(l) (2007); MONROE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 13-115(1) (2007);
OCALA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106-136(e)(3) (2007); ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF
ORDNANCES § 22-33(a)(1) (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 15-36 (2007); PALM
COAST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-25 (2007); PANAMA CITY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE §
14-93(c)(3) (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE § 18-41(b) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE §
15-66(a)(2) (2007); SUWANNEE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-97(3) (2007);
TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-71(2) (2007); WINTER HAVEN, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 7.5-30D(3) (2007); OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.5-
59(e) (2006); SANTA ROSA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-139(e) (2006); WAKULLA COUNTY,
5
Walker: Little To Be Gay About: Few Protections in Florida Against Discri
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 32
crimination based upon sexual orientation in the realm of public accommo-
dations. 8
2. Telecommunications and Gas
Daytona Beach Shores has an ordinance protecting against discrimina-
tion based upon sexual orientation with regard to access to gas lines. 9
Twenty-one municipalities have enacted ordinances which preclude tele-
communications or cable television companies from discriminating against
clients based upon their sexual orientation.2"
3. The Sale and Procurement of Goods and Services
It is illegal in Miami-Dade County to discriminate based upon sexual
orientation in the sale of goods, or to condone tipping based upon sexual
orientation.2' Four municipalities in Florida have enacted statutes which
protect against discrimination based upon sexual orientation from occurring
in the procurement of goods and services by the municipality.22
FLA., CODE § 13.056(e)(3) (2006); HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS AND
ORDINANCES § 16 2-96(e)(3) (2003).
18. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-225 (2008); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE §
57.36(1)(b) (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16/2-22(a)(1) (2007); GAINESVILLE,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-67(a) (2007); GULFPORT FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-40
(2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007); MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 1 A-
19 (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE § 18-46(2) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-81
(2007); TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-61(2) (2007).
19. DAYTONA BEACH SHORES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES App. D § 19 (2006).
20. BAL HARBOUR, FLA., CODE § 7-1 1(13)(a) (2007); BELLEAIR BEACH, FLA., CITY CODE
§ 39(a) (2007); BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-471 (2007); BROWARD
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 20-465(a) (2007); CORAL SPRINGS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-
4(7) (2007); DANIA BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-156(a) (2007); GAINESVILLE,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14.5-157(b) (2007); HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE § 8-39(a) (2007);
LAUDERDALE-BY-THE-SEA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-24(g)(1) (2007); NEW PORT
RICHEY, FLA., CODE § 13-539(a) (2007); ORANGE PARK, FLA., CODE § 27-33(a) (2007); PALM
BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 116-11 (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 8-
15(e)(3) (2007); PASCO COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-39(a) (2007); RIVIERA
BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-51(c) (2007); SURFSIDE, FLA., CODE § 22-17(b)
(2007); WILTON MANORS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5.5-104(g)(1) (2007); MARCO
ISLAND, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-50(a) (2006); N. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 20-4(g)(1) (2006); BAY HARBOR ISLANDS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5/2-
11(13)(a) (2006); PORT RICHEY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-39(a) (2005).
21. MLMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 8A-110.1(3) (2007).
22. LAKE PARK, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-255(a) (2007); MIRAMAR, FLA., CODE §
2-260.1 (2007); W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 66-8 (2007); WILTON
MANORS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-268(q) (2007).
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4. Ordinances Relating to Forms of Speech
There are two municipalities within the state of Florida that have en-
acted ordinances precluding discrimination based upon sexual orientation in
the disbursement of parade permits. 3
Three municipalities have enacted ordinances which specifically declare
that graffiti with messages that display prejudices based upon sexual orienta-
tion are unlawful.24 Three Florida municipalities have codified nonbinding
campaign pledges to refrain from making sexual orientation an issue in po-
litical campaigns.
5. Ordinances Relating to Vehicular Services
Broward County has enacted barriers against discrimination based upon
sexual orientation by taxi companies.26 North Miami prohibits towing com-
panies from discriminating based upon sexual orientation.27
6. Miscellaneous
Lake Worth, Florida has taken the unique approach of incorporating
Florida's state civil rights protections into a civil rights ordinance covering
only the city of Lake Worth, but has explicitly included sexual orientation as
a protected status.28
B. Ordinances Enacted Which Negatively Impact Efforts Against
Discrimination
Occasionally, attitudes unsupportive of homosexual rights that are held
by lawmakers and their constituents are expressed through legislation.29 Two
methods through which this can be accomplished are by enacting definitions
23. CORAL GABLES, FLA., CODE § 62-192 (2008); BELLE GLADE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 17.5-4 (2007).
24. S. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-100 (2007); PEMBROKE PARK, FLA., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 5-206 (2004); PARKER, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-101 (2000).
25. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 11-4(e)(1) (2007); FORT MYERS, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 18-536 (2007); N. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-11 l(d)(1) (2007);
PASCO COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 115-6 (2007).
26. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 22 2-7(g) (2007).
27. N. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11-220 (2007).
28. LAKE WORTH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-2 (2007).
29. AMY D. RONNER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW 3 (2005).
2008]
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which explicitly exclude homosexual persons from protection, 30 or through
legislation actually attacking the rights of gays and lesbians.31 Perhaps the
most famous example of the latter is the amendment to the Colorado Consti-
tution which was passed in order to ban "all legislative, executive, or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect gay men
and lesbians. 32
The amendment was subsequently struck down by the United States
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,33 because the Court found it unconstitu-
tional that:
[h]omosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with re-
spect to transactions and relations in both the private and govern-
mental spheres, [and t]he amendment withdraws from homosexu-
als, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused
by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies.
34
The Court concluded that the amendment "classifie[d] homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
This Colorado cannot do. A [s]tate cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws. [The amendment] violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 35
Two Florida municipalities have included definitional clarifications
which are intended to prevent ordinances from being construed to offer pro-
tections based upon sexual orientation,36 and one municipality, in what could
be considered Florida's mini-replay of Romer, enacted legislation hostile to
the enactment of ordinances that would offer greater protections based upon
a person's sexual orientation.37
1. The Definitional Clarifications of Pinellas County and Bradenton
Two municipalities in Florida, seemingly in order to avoid any possible
misconstruing of their ordinances, have provided to the reader that the term
"handicap" does not apply to a person because of their sexual orientation;
30. See infra note 38 and accompanying discussion.
31. See infra notes 32-35, 39-46 and accompanying discussion.
32. RONNER, supra note 29, at 10.
33. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id. at 635.
36. See infra note 38 and accompanying discussion.
37. See infra notes 32-35, 39-46 and accompanying discussion.
[Vol. 32
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this effectively prevents courts from interpreting imprecise ordinances as
granting such protections."
2. The Tumultuous Case of Alachua County
Alachua County is unique among Florida municipalities in that it at-
tempted to create a barrier to the enactment of protective ordinances by en-
acting an amendment to its county charter stating, "the board of county
commissioners shall not adopt any ordinance creating classifications based
upon sexual orientation, sexual preference, or similar characteristics, except
as necessary to conform county ordinances to federal or state law."39 The
impetus for passing the amendment began, ironically, with the attempt to
pass a nondiscrimination ordinance which included protections against sex-
ual orientation discrimination, which succeeded in March of 1993 .40 After
this occurred, there was a backlash among Alachua County residents, and
"[t]he Alachua County ordinance was repealed by the voters ... in the Re-
publican landslide general election of November 8, 1994." '41 The amendment
prohibiting the enactment of protective ordinances was also enacted in 1994
after a county referendum on the issue passed with fifty-seven percent of the
vote.42
The amendment prohibiting the enactment of protections based upon
sexual orientation was challenged in a case filed in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Florida, Morris v. Hill.43 A final disposition was entered on the case in a
summary judgment proceeding on November 22, 1996. 44 In Morris, the
court considered the then recently decided Romer to be the controlling case
law, stating that "[t]he issue presented to this court is whether Amendment 1,
the 1994 amendment to... the Alachua County Home Rule Charter, violates
the Equal Protection [C]lause of the Constitution of the United States as in-
terpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans. 45 The
court found that it was, explaining that:
38. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101 (2007); BRADENTON, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 46-2 (2006).
39. ALACHUA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.2(D) (2007).
40. Terl, supra note 6, at 839.
41. Id. at 840; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 757-58.
42. ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS 145 (2005).
43. Final Judgment at 1, Morris v. Hill, No. 94-2084-CA (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,
1996).
44. Id. at3.
45. Id. at 1.
20081
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Amendment I to the Alachua County Home Rule Charter,
though narrower in many respects, suffers from the same constitu-
tional infirmities as the Colorado amendment struck down in Ro-
mer. Amendment 1 singles out one characteristic, sexual orienta-
tion, [as] the basis for discrimination against homosexuals and bi-
sexuals, and prevents the Alachua County Commission from pass-
ing any laws without a referendum, to provide protection against
discrimination. It effectively restructures the local government so
that those of homosexual and bi-sexual orientation are disabled
from seeking safeguards that others may seek without constraint,
placing homosexuals and bi-sexuals on an unequal footing from
anyone else when it comes to seeking protection. . . .Under the
analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Romer,
there is no legitimate governmental interest that can support
Amendment 1. Amendment I's focus on sexual orientation cannot
be explained on any rational basis other than ... a manifestation of
the majority's condemnation of homosexuality ... and the desire
to disable homosexuals and bi-sexuals from seeking protective leg-
islation from the county commission.
46
C. A Possible Explanation for the Disinclination of Municipalities to Enact
Protective Ordinances
Beyond the outright hostility displayed in some legislative enactments
against gays and lesbians, there is a potentially more damaging attitude to-
wards homosexual rights that a legislature can adopt; this attitude is that their
enactment will have no beneficial effects upon the rights of gays and lesbi-
ans, and therefore, there is no purpose in making such an enactment. The
City of Hallandale Beach, Florida has displayed such an attitude with regard
to discrimination ordinances in general, which may be one of the reasons it
has not enacted an ordinance which grants protections based upon sexual
orientation.4 7 In a meeting of the City Commission on April 2, 2002, there
was a discussion relating to the creation of a Community Relations Board
which would "foster harmony, work to improve communication, and address
discrimination based [upon] race, religion, economic status, and other fac-
tors." ' The proposed Community Relations Board was struck down because
members of the City Commission felt that Hallandale Beach was too small, it
46. Id at 2-3.
47. See Hallandale Beach, Fla. City Comm'n, Minutes of Regular Meeting (April 2,
2002) (on file with City Comm'n).
48. Id.
[Vol. 32
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would impede the work of the police, and it was believed that citizens would
be uninterested in such an effort.49
III. FLORIDA CASE LAW AND FEDERAL CASE LAW RELATING TO FLORIDA:
A DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Florida Constitution offers protections to citizens of Florida in ar-
eas of privacy, as well as in equal protection areas." Furthermore, advocates
of homosexual rights have argued in court proceedings that the United States
Constitution precludes Florida from taking certain actions." One example of
this is the attack on Florida statutory enactments using the United States
Constitution. Generally, however, advocates of homosexual rights have
met with extremely limited success in advancing protections based upon
sexual orientation through cases advocating protections under the Florida
Constitution, or attacking actions taken by Florida with the United States
Constitution."
A. Privacy Rights and Protection from Discrimination Based upon Sexual
Orientation
The Florida Constitution states in Article I, section 23 that "[e]very
natural person has a right to be let alone and free from governmental intru-
sion into [his] private life."54 When adopted in 1980, it was thought that
privacy protections would be substantially bolstered. For those advocating
extending privacy protections to protect gays and lesbians from discrimina-
tion, it has been disappointing that Florida courts have shown an "overabun-
dance of caution ... [and] seem reluctant to take section 23's straightforward
command at face value. 56
49. Id.
50. See discussion infra Part III.
51. See discussion infra Part III.A1, B.
52. See discussion infra Part III.A2, B2.
53. See discussion infra Part III.
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
55. John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the Reality
Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REv. 775,776 (1994).
56. Id.
2008]
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1. Florida Cases Exploring Florida Constitutional Protections
One of the few Florida cases which discuss constitutional protections
against discrimination based upon sexual orientation is a trial court case
which extends limited protection from workplace discrimination based upon
sexual orientation, Woodard v. Gallagher." In Woodard, a deputy sheriff
was fired by the Sheriff of Orange County for homosexual conduct under-
taken before the deputy sheriff began employment with the Sheriffs office.58
The Sheriff became aware of the conduct only through an "accidental dis-
covery of [the plaintiffs] homosexual conduct prior to [the plaintiff] becom-
ing a deputy sheriff and [the plaintiffs] honest answers ... posed to him by
agents of the Sheriff about his sexual conduct and preference."59 The court
considered several constitutional arguments and determined that the Sheriff
had violated the deputy sheriff's right to privacy granted by the Florida Con-
stitution.60
In finding that the actions of the Sheriff violated the privacy rights of
the plaintiff, the court in Woodard explained:
[t]here was no evidence that his job or public life was affected in
any respect by [the plaintiff's homosexual] conduct. Such conduct
was not unlawful and there was no public rumor as to his involve-
ment in any sexual conduct. Also, he stated that he .. .would
even abstain from any personal homosexual relationships if that
was required to keep his job.6'
The appropriate standard of review for analyzing Article I, section 23
claims is articulated in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.62 In
Winfield, the court stated that:
[s]ince the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard
of review, it is important for us to identify an explicit standard to
be applied in order to give proper force and effect to the amend-
ment. The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we be-
lieve demands the compelling state interest standard. This test
shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on pri-
vacy. The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
57. 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 41,652, at 71,730-32 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 1992).
58. Id. at 71,731.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.63
In Woodard, while finding that the Sheriff had a legitimate, but not
compelling interest in gaining knowledge about the sexual orientation of
deputies so that he could "make use of the deputies' aptitudes," he could not
use this knowledge to punish the deputies.'
In Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox65
(Cox 1), a case involving Florida's refusal to allow the adoption of a child by
two homosexual men, a Florida appellate court had the opportunity to ad-
dress the issue of sexual orientation and privacy rights,6 6 but chose not to
decide directly as to whether or not sexual orientation is protected by the
Florida Constitution.67 Instead, when the court examined the facts of the
case and noted that the plaintiffs had voluntarily given the information that
they were homosexual,68 the court stated that "[the plaintiffs] voluntarily
admitted that they are homosexual. They cannot claim an expectation of
privacy concerning a fact that they have willingly disclosed. ' 69 The problem
with this logic is that:
[b]y putting the question on the form, the state demanded private
information about the applicants' background. Further, if Cox and
Jackman had not answered the question, one of two things would
have happened-they would have been presumed to be homosex-
ual, or HRS would have specifically inquired as to their sexual ori-
70
entation.
On appeal, in Cox v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services71 (Cox fl), the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's
ruling with respect to the decision on whether the Florida Constitution grants
privacy protections to persons based upon their sexual orientation.7 2
63. Id.
64. Woodard, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,652, at 71,73 1.
65. 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc).
66. See id. at 1215-17.
67. Id. at 1217-18.
68. Id. at 1212.
69. Id. at 1215.
70. Tiffani G. Lee, Case Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services:
A Challenge to Florida's Homosexual Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMi L. REv. 151, 161 (1996).
71. 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
72. Id. at 903.
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2. The Federal Refusal to Strike down a Florida Law Under United States
Constitutional Privacy Rights
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard Lofion v. Secre-
tary of the Department of Children and Family Services,73 in which a chal-
lenge to Florida's refusal to allow homosexual persons to adopt children was
again asserted.7 4 The plaintiffs, in challenging a Florida statute prohibiting
adoption by homosexual persons,75 relied on Lawrence v. Texas,76 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court wrote an opinion reflecting the
proposition that "the state cannot criminalize private, consensual, homosex-
ual behavior.",77 The statute which the plaintiffs challenged in Lofton reads
"[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual."" In Lofton, the plaintiffs argued that Lawrence "identified a
hitherto unarticulated fundamental right to private sexual intimacy., 79 The
Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the Florida Constitution grants
privacy protections based upon sexual orientation; instead, it distinguished
Lawrence, and rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating:
[w]e conclude that it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading
of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.
Accordingly, we need not resolve the second prong of appellants'
fundamental-rights argument: whether exclusion from the statu-
tory privilege of adoption because of appellants' sexual conduct
creates an impermissible burden on the exercise of their asserted
right to private sexual intimacy. 0
While ultimately deciding that the plaintiffs' interpretation of Lawrence
was incorrect, the court did not definitively state that sexual orientation was
not protected by constitutional privacy rights.8 ' Instead, the court stated that
"the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case ... [and] cannot
be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons."8'2 This
73. 358 F.3d 804 (11 th Cir. 2004).
74. Id. at 808.
75. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage 17 (Univ. of Va.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper 56, 2007), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context-uvalwps.
78. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
79. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815.
80. Id. at 817.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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should be interpreted not as a definitively negative outcome for homosexual
persons, but rather as a decision which reflects cautious judicial restraint, a
sentiment expressed earlier in the opinion. 3
B. The Florida Equal Protection Clause: A Dead End for Those
Advocating the Extension of Heightened Protections Based upon Sexual
Orientation
The Florida Constitution states: "[a]ll natural persons, female and male
alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, [and] to pursue happiness." 4
Florida courts have not designated sexual orientation as a suspect class; if
they did so, it would offer a heightened level of protection.85 Florida courts
interpret Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution as being equivalent
to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.6 Federal
courts have declined to raise sexual orientation to the level of a suspect
class.8 7 Florida courts have followed this example, and discrimination based
upon sexual orientation receives rational basis review. 8
1. Woodard and Cox: Indications of Judicial Reluctance
The court in Woodard, while extending privacy protections against dis-
crimination based upon sexual orientation, balked at extending suspect class
status based upon sexual orientation, stating that:
because of the turmoil in this area, I ... shift the equal protection
issue in this case and [do] not reach the decision of finding that
homosexually oriented persons are entitled to heightened scrutiny
as a class and that the Sheriffs actions are unconstitutional under
equal protection standards. In light of [the extension of privacy
protections to the plaintiff], the issue of heightened [equal] protec-
83. Id. at 815.
84. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
85. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983).
86. Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 408 So. 2d 711, 714 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
87. E.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990).
88. Woodard v. Gallagher, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 141,652, at 71,732 (Fla. 9th Cir.
Ct. 1992).
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tion [rights] to homosexually oriented persons as a class need not
be reached. 89
Despite this outcome, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion in dicta
regarding discrimination based upon sexual orientation, in what reads as an
indictment of higher courts and society:
[t]his case brings into focus the fact that persons, both individually
and as a class, can presently be ... discriminated against by our
government because of their homosexual orientation unless those
persons can show [under the rational basis test] that such discrimi-
nation is completely arbitrary or irrational . . . [despite it being
shown that] a rational basis test can be easily abused and used to
hide prejudice behind constructed or pretextual reasons ... [i]t ap-
pears that the only reason [homosexual persons] have not been
granted heightened equal protection rights is because the differ-
ence in them touches most peoples' deeply ingrained heterosexual
orientation both personally and culturally.
90
The court in Cox I also addressed the issue of equal protection rights
and sexual orientation, but in contrast to the hesitant language in Woodard,
its decision squarely opposed granting equal protection rights based upon
sexual orientation. 91 The court explained that "neither the statutory privilege
to adopt nor the choice to engage in homosexual activity involves a funda-
mental right. Thus, strict scrutiny can apply in this case only if homosexual
activity creates a suspect classification." 92 The court then concluded that
there was no basis to create a new suspect class based upon sexual orienta-
tion, and declined to apply strict scrutiny to the case, applying instead ra-
tional basis review.93 Interestingly, the decision seems to suggest that the
court may have been receptive to an argument for granting intermediate level
review based upon sexual orientation, but "[t]he trial court did not rely upon
an intermediate review [and] [t]he parties have neither argued for such a re-
view nor provided case law from other courts adopting such an approach to
homosexual activity. 94
While Cox I provides insight into how one Florida appellate court ap-
proaches questions of sexual orientation from an equal protection standpoint,
89. Id. (dictum).
90. Id. at 71,731-32 (dictum).
91. Coxl, 627So. 2dat 1218-19.
92. Id. at 1218.
93. Id. at 1219.
94. Id. at 1218.
[Vol. 32
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/9
LITTLE TO BE GA YABOUT
unfortunately for those seeking authoritative law on the subject, it is no
longer binding authority on this point of law because it was reversed on ap-
peal in COx j.95 In Cox II, the Supreme Court of Florida did not attack the
legal reasoning of the court in Cox I, but instead found that the factual record
was insufficient to come to a decision on the issue, stating that "[t]he record
is insufficient to determine that this statute can be sustained against an attack
as to its constitutional validity on the rational basis standard for equal protec-
tion under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. A more complete
record is necessary in order to determine this issue."96 The "case was volun-
tarily dismissed before the" case could be heard again to more thoroughly
address the equal protection claims under the Florida Constitution.97 Be-
cause of this outcome, the question of whether or not sexual orientation de-
mands a higher level of review than rational basis remains undetermined.98
2. The Role of Judicial Deference
Because decisions extending constitutional protections based upon sex-
ual orientation are embroiled in cultural controversy,99 it is unsurprising that
decisions are often reached which avoid discussions of extending such pro-
tections. This reluctance is displayed when courts fall back on the philoso-
phy of judicial restraint to avoid deciding cases on particular grounds, such
as in Woodard, where the court stated that the decision to grant heightened
levels of protection based upon sexual orientation "is best left to a higher
court or our legislature."' 00 The Second District Court of Appeal expressed
similar reservations in Cox I, stating that:
[t]he debate over the nature of homosexuality and the wisdom of
the strictures that our society has historically placed upon homo-
sexual activity cannot and should not be resolved today in this
court. For purposes of governance, the legislature is the proper fo-
rum in which to conduct this debate so long as its decisions are
permitted by the state and federal constitutions.'
01
95. See Cox II, 656 So. 2d at 903.
96. Id.
97. Terl, supra note 6, at 824; see also, Adams, supra note 6, at 766.
98. See Lee, supra note 70, at 167.
99. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 95-96 (2003).
100. Woodard v. Gallagher, 59 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,652, at 71,732 (Fla. 9th Cir.
Ct. 1992).
101. CoxI,627So.2dat1212.
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The court also pointed out that rational basis review is the test which is
the most deferential to the legislature, stating that "[t]his test is intended to
permit the legislature to make most public policy decisions without interfer-
ence from the courts."'' 0 2 In concluding, the court again made reference to
the legislature by stating that "[i]t may be that the legislature should revisit
this issue . . . but we cannot say that the limited research reflected in this
record compels the judiciary to override the legislature's reasoning."'' 3
Lofton, decided by a federal circuit court, also demonstrates an unwill-
ingness to stray away from a position of judicial deference with regard to
sexual orientation and constitutional protections. '4 In Lofton, the court
states that "[t]here is no precedent for appellants' novel proposition ... we
decline appellants' invitation to recognize a new fundamental right ... [s]uch
an expansion ... would well exceed our judicial mandate as a lower federal
court." 5 Thus, because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the
position that they are too low of a court to recognize a new fundamental
right, they have also taken the position that the United States Supreme Court
is the only Court which may properly recognize new fundamental rights. 0 6
IV. THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
AND ATTEMPTS BY ADVOCATES OF HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS TO GAIN
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 THROUGH
THE COURT SYSTEM
Florida has codified a number of protections against discrimination
based upon a person's characteristics or status in what is known as the "Flor-
ida Civil Rights Act of 1992. ' 'I07 The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 was
"patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' 08
The general purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 are to
secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimina-
tion because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
handicap, or marital status and thereby to protect their interest in
102. Id. at 1219.
103. Id. at 1220.
104. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 (1 1th
Cir. 2004).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. FLA. STAT. § 760.01(1) (2007).
108. Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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personal dignity, to make available to the state their full productive
capacities, to secure the state against domestic strife and unrest, to
preserve the public safety, health, and general welfare, and to pro-
mote the interests, rights, and privileges of individuals within the
state.'o9
Recently, an amendment was proposed which would enlarge the scope
of statuses protected by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." ° On March
20, 2007, Florida State Senator Ted Deutch proposed an amendment which
would add "sexual orientation" and "familial status" to the list of protected
statuses, and replace the term "handicap" with the term "disability" through-
out the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,"' and other sections relating to civil
rights. The amendment would offer protections against discrimination based
upon sexual orientation "in the areas of education,'1 2 employment," 3 hous-
ing.' 4 public accommodations," 5 the affording of public lodging," 6 rental
housing, "' access to loans, 8 and development decisions." 9
A. Innovative Efforts to Protect Against Discrimination Based upon Sexual
Orientation
Because the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 does not currently contain
explicit protections against discrimination based upon sexual orientation,
homosexual persons have attempted to find protections using innovative le-
gal theories. 20 These legal theories have met with mixed success, and have
forced homosexual persons to take positions that are often unpalatable.' 21
Two legal theories which proponents of homosexual rights have attempted to
use to extend protections, or could be argued to extend protections to homo-
sexual persons, is arguing that homosexuality is a legal handicap, and argu-
109. FLA. STAT. § 760.01(2).
110. Fla. SB 2628 (2007); see also Fla. HB 639 (2007). HB 639 is the identical version of
SB 2628 in the Florida House of Representatives.
111. Fla. SB 2628, § 1.
112. Id. §4.
113. Id § 6.
114. Id. §9.
115. Id. § 5.
116. Fla. SB 2628, § 7.
117. Id. § 9.
118. Id. § 11.
119. Id. § 12.
120. See infra discussion Part 1V A.
121. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying discussion.
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ing that social stereotypes of HIV/AIDS afflictions among the homosexual
community causes discrimination against homosexual persons.' 22
1. The Perception of Homosexuality as a Handicap or Disability
The proposed amendment strikes the definition of "handicap" and re-
places it with the word "disability," and defines disability similarly to handi-
cap. 23 The definition of "disability" in the amendment is "[a] physical or
mental impairment that a person has, has a record of having, or is regarded as
having, that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or ... [a]
developmental disability.' ' 124 The definition of "handicap" being stricken is
"a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or he or she has a record of having, or is regarded as
having, such physical or mental impairment."' 25 These are somewhat expan-
sive definitions, and it is foreseeable that some people may consider homo-
sexuality to fall within them. 126 Indeed, "[a]lthough most homosexuals likely
would resist being considered disabled, some segments of society continue to
view homosexuality as a handicap.' 27 It is not outside the realm of possi-
bilities that a clever attorney could argue that homosexuality is a legally pro-
tectable handicap; perhaps this is why Pinellas County and Bradenton, Flor-
ida, have enacted ordinances explicitly excluding homosexuality from the
definition of "handicap."'28 The definition of "handicap" in Pinellas County,
as an illustrative example, provides that "reference to 'an individual with a
handicap' or to 'handicap' does not apply to an individual because of that
individual's sexual orientation or because that individual is a transvestite.' 29
Case law exists which demonstrates attempts to make a link between
homosexuality and suffering from a handicap. 3 ° In Blackwell v. United
122. See infra discussion Part W Al-A2.
123. Fla. SB 2628, § 8.
124. Id.
125. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(7)(a) (2007).
126. See Louis P. Nappen, Why Segregated Schools for Gay Students May Pass a 'Sepa-
rate but Equal' Analysis but Fail Other Issues and Concerns, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 101, 111 (2005).
127. Id; see also Alan Medinger, Narrowing the Homosexual Problem, REGENERATION
NEWS (Regeneration Ministries, Baltimore, Md.) March-April 2005, at 2,
http://www.regenerationministries.org/newsletters/200503.pdf (stating that "[u]nresolved
homosexuality is a handicap, but others with far worse handicaps get on with productive
lives," and making further claims that homosexual persons have feelings of inadequacy).
128. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101 (2007); BRADENTON, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 46-2 (2006).
129. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101.
130. See, e.g., Blackwell v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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States Department of Treasury,3 ' a transvestite sued for unlawful discrimi-
nation based upon his perceived sexual orientation when an interviewer per-
ceived him to be homosexual based upon his status as a transvestite. 32 Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a judge for the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia at the time, authored the court's opinion and stated that:
plaintiff-appellant ... suffered discriminatory denial of a govern-
ment employment opportunity because the supervisory officer who
served as second interviewer, Mr. Strange, perceived Blackwell to
be a homosexual.... [T]here is no precedent for holding that one's
sexual orientation or preference [is protected as a handicapped
status, and furthermore] ... the liability of a government depart-
ment.., should not turn on the level of sophistication or ability to
classify of the particular interviewing officer-in this case, on
whether that officer knows that homosexuality and transvestism
are not one and the same. 33
If Florida legislators do not pass an amendment to the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992 in order to include sexual orientation as a protected cate-
gory, it is possible that a homosexual person may attempt to argue that ho-
mosexuality is a "a physical or mental impairment [that] substantially limits
one or more major life activities,"'' 34 in an argument similar to the one made
in Blackwell.135 While the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 is generally in-
terpreted similarly to Title VII claims, 136 it is possible that Florida could di-
verge from federal courts that do not classify homosexuality as a handicap
and allow protections to be extended based upon sexual orientation.'37 Ac-
cording to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which was interpreting the
Florida Human Rights Act-the previous name of the Florida Civil Rights
Act of 1992138
131. Id. at 1183.
132. Id. at 1183-84.
133. Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(7)(a) (2007).
135. Blackwell, 830 F.2d at 1183-84.
136. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 1989) (stating
that "Florida's Human Rights Act appears to be patterned after Title VII of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964").
137. See Andujar v. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
138. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Dupont, 933 So. 2d 75, 100 n.35 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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[t]he United States is a land of dual sovereigns. Citizens are sub-
ject to the sovereign power of the United States, but they are also
subject to the sovereign power of the state in which they reside.
Although designed to play different roles in our governmental
scheme, the two sovereigns sometimes legislate on the same sub-
ject. If Congress does not intend for its legislation to displace state
laws on the same subject, a citizen of a state may have rights under
the federal law, and at the same time she may have rights under the
state law.'
39
The court concluded by stating, "it is clear that a claim made under the
one statute is not the same cause of action as a claim made under the
other.
1 40
Further support for the possibility of homosexuality being interpreted as
falling under the definition of "handicap" can be found in Smith v. City of
Jacksonville Correctional Institution14' where the Florida Division of Ad-
ministrative Hearings found that transsexualism was a handicap.' 42 Homo-
sexual persons are considered to have a handicap by some portions of soci-
ety. 143 "Homosexuality and transsexuality [both] subvert norms and expecta-
tions about how women and men should live their lives as sexual beings,
[and] [t]raditional notions of sex and gender are transgressed by both homo-
sexuals and transsexuals."' ' 4 Additionally, some Florida judicial bodies have
extended protections against discrimination to transsexuals,'45 and therefore
it should not seem outside the realm of possibility that judicial bodies in
Florida may extend protections from discrimination based upon sexual orien-
tation to homosexuals.
139. Andujar, 659 So. 2d at 1216.
140. Id. at 1217.
141. No. 88-5451, 1991 WL 833882 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 2, 1991); but see Order
Dismissing Petition for Relief at 2, Fishbaugh v. Brevard County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 22-
02697 (Fla. Comm'n on Hum. Rel. Aug. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ros/2003/03-1139%20Agency%20Final%200rder.pdf.
142. Smith, 1991 WL 833882, at*14.
143. Nappen, supra note 126, at I 11.
144. Melinda Chow, Note, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence and an
Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination under Title VII, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 207, 215
(2005).
145. Smith, 1991 WL 833882, at *14.
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2. Social Stereotypes of HIV/AIDS, the Homosexual Community, and
Efforts to Use Such Stereotypes to Advance Protections for Homosexual
Persons Under Florida Law
Florida Statutes section 760.50 offers protections against discrimination
based upon a person's HIV/AIDS status.1 46 It states in part that "[a]ny per-
son with or perceived as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome, ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human immunode-
ficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handicapped
persons.' ' 47 The Florida legislature found that such protections were neces-
sary because:
persons infected or believed to be infected with human immunode-
ficiency virus have suffered and will continue to suffer irrational
and scientifically unfounded discrimination. The [l]egislature fur-
ther finds and declares that society itself is harmed by this dis-
crimination, as otherwise able-bodied persons are deprived of the
means of supporting themselves, providing for their own health
care, housing themselves, and participating in the opportunities
otherwise available to them in society.
148
Unfortunately, negative stereotypes about homosexual persons pervade
society, including the "stereotype that links homosexual orientation with
AIDS.' ' 149 Because negative stereotypes linking HIV/AIDS to homosexual
persons exist, 5 ' and because discrimination against HIV/AIDS exists in so-
ciety,'5 1 homosexual persons have been discriminated against because of the
belief that they have HIV/AIDS and have challenged this discrimination
based upon this perceived status. 52 In Cordero v. AMR Services Corp.,153 the
146. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (2007).
147. Id.
148. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1).
149. Lawrence Kent Mendenhall, Note, Misters Korematsu and Steffan: The Japanese
Internment and the Military's Ban on Gays in the Armed Forces, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 196, 225
(1995). The dissent in Steffan v. Perry rejects this stereotype. 41 F.3d 677, 720 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc) (Wald, J. dissenting) (noting that "[hiomosexual orientation cannot spread the
AIDS virus. Homosexual, or heterosexual, conduct can-if one participant carries the vi-
rus."); see also Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual
Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133, 157 (1992). "The word 'homosex-
ual' itself raises the negative imagery and characteristic stereotyping that society has imputed
to the term. Common negative images and stereotypes include: homosexuals are loathsome
sex addicts who spread AIDS and other venereal diseases." Mison, supra, at 157.
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1).
152. See, e.g., Cordero v. AMR Servs. Corp., 7 A.D. Cases 98, 98 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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[homosexual] [p]laintiff allege[d] that Defendant's stated reason
for his discharge was pretextual. Plaintiff claims that Defendant
terminated his employment in contravention of Florida Statutes
§760.50 because he was perceived to carry... [HIV/AIDS] ... or
to have undergone HIV testing. Plaintiff has been tested for HIV,
but does not carry the virus. 154
In Kaufman v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc.,' 55 a claim was filed
under Florida Statutes section 760.50 because an employee of Checker's
Restaurant had anti-homosexual insults directed at him and references were
made that implied the employee had contracted HIV/AIDS. 156 Cordero and
Kaufman both attempt to make a link between the perception of HIV/AIDS
infection and discrimination based upon sexual orientation.'57 If the Florida
Legislature were to pass an amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992-which granted explicit protections against discrimination based on
sexual orientation-such an attempt would not be necessary because litigants
could file suits based solely upon sexual orientation-based discrimination
instead of attempting to make an attenuated link through HIV/AIDS dis-
crimination.'
V. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON MARRIAGE
Recently, a vocal minority of Florida's populace succeeded in a years-
long effort to place a referendum to amend the Florida Constitution; the aim
of this referendum is to prevent any legislature in Florida from passing laws
which allow homosexuals to marry, or even to enter into a substantially
equivalent relationship.'59 The proposed amendment states that "[i]nasmuch
as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband
and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial
equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized."' 6 By including the words
"substantial equivalent," the proponents of the amendment seek to go further
than banning only gay marriage; under an explanation section on their web-
site entitled "The Amendment, Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions," the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 98.
155. 122 F.3d 892 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 893.
157. See Kaufman, 122 F.3d at 893; see also Cordero, 7 A.D. Cases at 98.
158. See generally FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (2007).
159. Alex Leary, Gay Marriage on Ballot, ST. PETE. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at IA.
160. Id.
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proponents explain that they intend the amendment to invalidate "any other
legal union that is treated as marriage.' 61
Broward County has codified a procedure in which gays and lesbians
may obtain a domestic partnership, which provides numerous protections
within Broward County. 62 West Palm Beach has codified a similar domestic
partnership ordinance. 163 Besides the fact that Broward County and West
Palm Beach refer to domestic partnership agreements, these domestic part-
nerships would seem to fall within the boundaries of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment that seeks to ban the substantial equivalent of marriage
otherwise; Broward County, for example, describes a relationship that cer-
tainly sounds akin to marriage, stating that "there are many individuals who
establish and maintain a significant personal, emotional, and economic rela-
tionship with another individual. Individuals forming such domestic partner-
ships often live in a committed family relationship."'" 4 The constitutional
amendment, therefore, has extremely important repercussions for those that
have registered as living in a domestic partnership; their rights may be
stripped. One organization that is campaigning against the amendment states
that:
[t]he ballot language is written in very broad terms that will be
interpreted by our courts. Possible scenarios can include the
termination of all domestic partner registries in the state.
Domestic Partner registries provide for hospital visitation rights.
When the state of Michigan passed similar language, the Michigan
Court of Appeals ruled that the state's constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage prevents public institutions from
providing benefits to domestic partners employed by those
institutions. In our own state, the Florida Legislature Office of
Economic and Demographic Research clearly denotes the
possibility of losing domestic partner registries, the loss of
recognized common law marriages and other consequences
affecting both same-sex and opposite sex couples.' 65
The proponents of the amendment have sought to preempt arguments
that the amendment will strip benefits granted through domestic partnership
161. Florida Coal. to Protect Marriage, Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 2008),
http://www.florida4marriage.org/faqs.html [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
162. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE §§ 161/2-151 to 16'/-162 (2007).
163. W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 42-47 to 42-50 (2007).
164. BROWARD CoUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16 /-151.
165. Florida Red & Blue, FAQs, http://www.floridaredandblue.com/faqs (last visited Apr.
20, 2008).
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laws, by stating that "our amendment will not invalidate benefits granted
from domestic partnerships or any other source."' 66 Explaining further, the
proponents state that "[t]he [a]mendment does not affect benefits offered or
contracted in the private sector... [or] prohibit the state or local government
from passing laws which confer rights to unmarried persons."'67 There is a
glaring problem with their explanation that the amendment will not limit
benefits or laws granting rights to unmarried persons, though; the proponents
of the amendment accept a Government Accounting Office assessment that
there are some 1134 rights conferred by marriage. 68 Even if existing Do-
mestic Partnerships are recognized as valid, while the proponents of the
amendment helpfully inform the reader that the amendment will not strip
privately bargained for contractual benefits, or prevent governments from
passing laws which would grant rights to unmarried persons, they fail to ac-
knowledge the obvious repercussion; if the amendment were ratified, there
would need to be some combination of 1134 laws and contracts to grant the
same amount of rights that one marriage certificate grants to heterosexual
spouses. 169
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the state of the law in Florida, with regard to existing protec-
tions against discrimination based upon sexual orientation, is both inconsis-
tent and inadequate; some actions have been taken which are openly hostile
to the rights of gays and lesbians. Across Florida, a few municipalities are
enacting ordinances protecting against discrimination, while some have cho-
166. Fla. Coal. to Protect Marriage, Know Your Opponents Arguments,
http://www.florida4marriage.org/defenders.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Know Your Opponents Arguments].
167. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161.
168. Know Your Opponents Arguments, supra note 166.
169. Additionally, the language of the amendment portends further ominous possibilities:
the denial of rights to those not only in same-sex domestic partnerships, but also to hetero-
sexuals who do not wish to marry, but enter into a domestic partnership or similar union.
Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in interpreting a ratified state constitutional amendment with
similar language to the proposed Florida amendment, stated that "[i]t is undisputed that under
the marriage amendment, heterosexual couples who have not married also may not obtain
employment benefits as a couple on the basis of an agreement." Id. Former United States
Representative and Florida gubernatorial candidate Jim Davis opined that as applied to Flor-
ida, "[i]f [the amendment] passes, unmarried Floridians in committed relationships-
especially seniors who may remain unmarried by choice-could lose their ability to share
healthcare coverage." Jim Davis, 'Marriage Protection' an Unnecessary Burden, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 11, 2008, at A18.
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sen not to; among the municipalities that have, there is a decided lack of ho-
mogeneity in the extent of protections offered. 7 ° Florida courts offer weak
and inconsistent protections depending upon the level of court, and the por-
tion of the Florida Constitution being examined. 7' Federal courts have not
offered a clear guideline as to what legislative enactments by the states are
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.72 The Florida legisla-
ture has thus far refused to enact explicit protections in the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992; 173 as a result, advocates of homosexual rights have at-
tempted to find protections in innovative, but unsuccessful legal theories. 74
Perhaps most disconcerting of all is the placement on the ballot of a proposed
amendment to the Florida Constitution, which would effectively ban gay
marriage or substantial equivalents in Florida.1
75
Because of the uneven application of protections through the court sys-
tem, the Florida legislature should not ignore the issue of discrimination
based upon sexual discrimination, and should take one of two positions. The
legislature should either enact the proposed amendment to the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992, and explicitly grant protections against discrimination
based upon sexual orientation in order to avoid unexpected and uneven ap-
plications of protections by the court system; or take a different tack, and
follow the examples of Pinellas County and Bradenton, Florida and explicitly
define the terms in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to prevent protec-
tions from being granted based upon sexual orientation in order to achieve
the same result as those counties. While this may strike some as unpalatable,
it would provide a clear signal to the judiciary of the intent of the legislature,
and would also provide a clear signal to municipalities that feel it is not an
issue that is within their purview. Ideally, the legislature would pass the pro-
posed amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, because it would
provide protections much more evenly and quickly than indicating to the
municipalities that they should pass ordinances on the issue. This, however,
is not an ideal world; most likely, the issue will stagnate in the legislature,
and the trend extending protections against discrimination based upon sexual
orientation will continue in sporadic enactments of municipal ordinances.
Unfortunately, the most enthusiastic groups involved in the issue of gay and
lesbian rights seem to be those that oppose them; it remains to be seen
whether the proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution will result in a
170. See discussion supra Part II.
171. See discussion supra Part III.
172. See id.
173. See discussion supra Part IV.
174. See id.
175. See discussion supra Part V.
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step backwards for gay and lesbian advocates, or the bittersweet victory of
maintaining the status quo.
He added, [t]hat ... [t]here was another Point which a little per-
plexed him at present.... I had already explained the Meaning of
the Word; but he was at a Loss how it should come to pass, that
the Law which was intended for every Man's Preservation should
be any Man's Ruin.1
76
176. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 281 (1940).
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